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Trends in the Law of Damages
by JohnW. Reed
The law of damages deals with the process of translating
harm into dollars. It is not, however, a coherent body of
knowledge. Rather, it consists of an amalgam of many
concepts and rules having to do with fundamental policy
questions about loss-shifting, risk-spreading, and
allocation of functions between judge and jury. Because
damages is a "non-subject," little attention is paid to it in
law school curricula and there is little writing about it. As
one commentator put it, the law of damages "plods its
way, ignored by academicians and 'accepted' by the
courts. . . . The 'winds of change' sweeping over other
areas of law rarely stir the law of damages. There are a few
ripples here and there, to be sure, but no one gets too
excited."
In 1935, Charles McCormick produced his famous
hornbook on damages, and for lack of a superseding
work, it remains the most recent general study. Dobbs on
Remedies, a 1973 volume, provides excellent analysis of
recent developments, but the practitioner continues to use
McCormick as the benchmark. To appreciate the
developments of the past 40 years, it is necessary first to
refresh our recollections of the McCormick 1935 text.
McCormick identified four major questions that the
law of damages seeks to answer. First, what elements of
the party's loss, injury, or grievance will be recognized as
grounds of compensation? For example, in contract can
one recover for disappointment due to the failure of the
bargain? Second, what formula of measurement is to be
used in fixing compensation for the elements of loss that
are recognized. For example, market value or value in
use? Value at what time? Third, what are the limits on the
application of these formulas to the recognized elements?
For example, certainty, contemplation of the parties,
foreseeability. Fourth, what procedural rules regulate the
manner in which counsel can plead and prove these
things, and what procedural rules govern appellate courts
in dealing with these issues? He employed 186 black-letter
statements to enunciate the answers to these questions.
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After stating pleading requirements, with particular
reference to general and special damages, and explaining
the concept of nominal damages, McCormick identified
five principles involved in determining compensatory
damages. Most significant of these was the rule of
certainty, "requiring a reasonable degree of persuasive-
ness in the proof of the fact and of the amount of the
damage." It was another way of saying that damages
could not be remote, speculative, or contingent. As of
1935, the rule was applied primarily to cases involving loss
of commercial profits.
The other general discussions dealt with the familiar
rule requiring the person harmed to use reasonable means
to avoid or minimize or mitigate his damage, the problems
of determining value of property, the concept of interest as
damages, and the American rules regarding counsel fees
and other expenses of litigation.
The remainder of the book was divided into parts
according to substantive law areas.
Materials on Torts
The section on torts contained, as one might expect,
material that could as well have been in a torts text. It
stated, for example, various proximate cause rules: "The
wrongdoer is liable for the consequences of negligent and
unskillful treatment by the physician of the injured
person, provided that he used reasonable care to select a
reputable physician." The discussion of exemplary
damages was positioned here. In McCormick's almost
quaint language they were said "to give outlet, in cases of
outrageous conduct, to the indignation of the jurors, and
they are defended as furnishing a needed deterrent to
wrongdoing .. "
In the section on damages for personal injuries-no-
table for its relative brevity-one finds little indication of
dollar amounts in those days. There are figures of
$20,000, $8,000, $10,000. Hardly anything is in six
figures, and then only to be set aside or reduced on
remittitur. Although the use of annuity tables was
recommended, there was no indication that economists
might be employed.
In this day of Equal Rights Amendment concern, one is
struck by the fact that in 1935 rules were stated governing
the husband's right to damages to his marital interests
from injury to the wife, but there was no mention of the
possibility that a wife might recover for injury to her
husband.
McCormick still found it necessary to explain Lord
Campbell's Act and the concept of survival of actions. He
reported that more than a third of the states still had
ceilings on death recoveries. The usual limit was $10,000;
it was $7,500 in Minnesota and Oregon, and only $5,000
in Maine and Colorado. The other tort chapters dealt with
malicious prosecution, false arrest, deceit, and the like,
collecting cases-mostly unremarkable-in each field.
The contracts discussion began with Hadley v. Baxen-
dale, which laid down the familiar rule that damages for
breach of contract can be recovered for losses reason-
ably foreseeable by the party to be charged when the
contract was made. McCormick said that, with the
exception of actions for breach of promise to marry and
for mistreatment of passengers by carriers and of guests
by hotels, contract damages did not include compensation
for mental distress, however foreseeable.
He stated the rule that liquidated damages constituting
a good faith estimate of the probable injury to be suffered
were enforceable but that an amount fixed merely as a
deterrent, to prevent a breach, would not be enforced. He
did not discuss the relationship, if any, between penalties
on the one hand and bonuses on the other. Again, the
remaining chapters dealt with particular kinds of
contracts, like employment contracts, construction
agreements, sales of property.
In McCormick's hornbook there was little grappling
with the economic and social values that, after all,
underlie and give rise to these rules. An awareness of those
values, often competing, is indispensible to the lawyer
who seeks not merely to know yesterday's law and to state
today's law, but also to predict tomorrow's law and
therefore to serve his client more effectively and more
responsibly.
An impression of the currents in damages is best gained
by examining developments with respect to particular
rules. A good first example is the certainty rule. For more
than a century a plaintiff has been required to establish
the amount of his damage with reasonable certainty.
Stating the rule to express the policy base of limiting the
jury's discretion, a trier of fact may not speculate but must
have factual basis for fixing damages. (A theme of all
damage law is supervision of the jury as it determines the
amount required to make the plaintiff whole.)
This does not mean that an injured plaintiff is without
relief simply because he cannot prove the precise sum
involved. Mere uncertainty as to amount will not prevent
recovery if the evidence is of such certainty "as the nature
of the case permits." Obviously, wrongful death and
personal injury damages fall into this category. To state
the rule, however, is to suggest that there is a level of
clarity or certainty below which a plaintiff may not fall and
yet recover damages.
The question of what constitutes sufficient certainty has
troubled judges and commentators over the years, and no
firm formulation seems possible. There is variation not
only between one time in history and another but also
between one kind of claim and another.
A Helpful Principle
The more recent cases, however, suggest a helpful
principle: the more important it seems to vindicate a
given interest or claim, the more willing a court is to
accept incomplete evidence on the damage issue.
Compare these two cases. First, there is an antitrust case
awarding lost profits to a theater owner who is unable to
get first-run pictures, even though he cannot prove how
much the profits would have been. Yet another court
refuses damages to a theater owner for a film distributor's
breach of contract to supply first-run rights to "The
Graduate," on the ground that the theater was new and
had no profit record.
The difference between the two cases is probably not in
the reasonable certainty of the profits (uncertain in both
instances) but in the policy of the substantive law: strong
in antitrust, only moderate in contract. The tort cases are
to similar effect. The court avoids a damage award
ostensibly on the ground that damages have not been
proved with adequate certainty but in reality because the
court doubted whether the substantive liability extended
as far as the plaintiff contended. When a court is
convinced an important value exists and finds the
defendant's conduct violated that value, it will accept less
certain proof of the amount of damages than where it
faces no special pressure to vindicate the plaintiffs
interest.
Foreseeability as a limitation on damages is subject to
the same kind of analysis. That is, if the defendant's
actions appear to violate a highly valued interest, a strong
policy, the court will find foreseeable certain
consequences that would not be so held in the case of less
culpable or reprehensible activity. In some small part,
foreseeability and certainty are two sides of the same coin;
as one expands, so does the other. And one must not omit
to mention no-fault concepts, which make foresight
irrelevant.
A second area of development involves "psychological
harm." Increasing awareness of mental and psychological
phenomena has an inevitable effect on the law of
damages. Rules governing recovery of damages for pain
and mental suffering have persistently, if gradually,
moved in the direction of greater legal cognizance of
psychological injury as a compensable harm.
Originally, mental suffering was recognized as a simply
parasitic element of damages that could be awarded only
if it accompanied another more fully acknowledged cause
of action. Gradually, however, the infliction of mental
injury came to be regarded as the basis of an independent
claim in certain situations. The evolution of the interest in
mental tranquility as a legally protected right has followed
a stereotypical pattern. It has moved through progressive
stages of recognizing an interest not to be intentionally
invaded, imposing a duty on participants in a common
calling not to encroach on that interest, and finally safe-
guarding the interest from invasions by the general
public.
No Stopping Point
The expansion process has by no means reached a
stopping point. Two areas in particular appear to be in
transition: bystander recovery and mental harm
unaccompanied by physical manifestations. The trend is
away from the outdated impact rule and away from the
zone-of-danger rule, toward a less restrictive standard of
foreseeability of mental effect on the person injured.
With more and more sophisticated views of emotional
status of individuals, the difficulty of proof and
measurement and the consequent danger of fraudulent
claims diminish. For example, a psychiatrist, by
observing behavior, reactions, and attitudes, can discern
effects of trauma that are very real and important though
not physical. These detrimental effects are scarcely less
certain in measurement than the phenomenon of physical
pain, for which recovery in damages is well established.
A striking current development is the growing size of
verdicts against insurers for suffering allegedly caused by
their failure reasonably to negotiate and to settle. Also
intriguing are the now-familiar recoveries for loss of life's
pleasures. Still open is the question of damages for an
injury that shortens one's life expectancy even though
there is no limitation on activity and no absolute proof,
of course, of a shorter life.
When new interests are recognized, new harms become
possible. A current illustration is the "wrongful birth"
case. Claims for a wrongful birth involve a paradox. The
rule has long been that when a child is killed, the parents'
loss of the pleasures that come from having the child in the
family outweighs the economic liberation of the parents,
who no longer need support that child. What then is the
rule when there is a "wrongful birth," for example in the
aftermath of a negligently performed sterilization? The
traditional view would deny damages, with the
satisfactions of parenthood outweighing the cost of
support. Yet the indications are that consistency will not
prevail and that damages will be awarded, although
principles of mitigating damages and offsetting benefits
immediately come up.
There are other interests now protected and productive
of damage claims that were only a gleam in someone's eye
a decade or two ago. Last November, for example, a
federal court awarded a large sum to an employee forced
into early retirement in violation of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act. Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Engineering Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J., 1975). The
judgment included compensation not only for his lost
wages but also for the pain and suffering caused by the
blow to his dignity and self-respect. Because of the illegal
action he had experienced "a syndrome of severe
abdominal pain, vomiting and impotency."
Collateral Sources
Of the rules dealing with offsets to damages, the one
most under attack is the collateral source rule, which
permits an injured plaintiff to obtain full recovery from
the tortfeasor even though he is also compensated by some
independent source. He thus may receive double recovery
or even a recovery for losses that he never suffered at all.
Familiar illustrations are insurance proceeds, donated
medical services, wage continuation plans, social security,
employment benefits.
The reasons most often advanced to justify the rule are
that the plaintiff has in many instances paid for these
benefits or that the donor intended to benefit him, and
that the wrongdoers should not get a windfall. But the
commentators agree that the stated reasons are not the
real ones, that the rule in truth is retained for its value in
financing personal injury litigation. Padding a tort award
because of collateral sources helps pay the contingent fee,
just as damages for pain and suffering do. The rule
probably will not be abolished until there are new methods
of financing litigation or until no-fault legislation wipes
out personal injury litigation. Meanwhile, however, the
rule appears to be decreasingly effective in protecting
plaintiffs as defendants increasingly succeed in getting
around it by adroitly suggesting other sources of succor.
In 1935 McCormick reported that more than a third of
the states still had ceilings on death recoveries-usually
$10,000. Today only a half-dozen states retain ceilings.
But whenever there is concern about jury generosity in a
particular field, as currently in professional malpractice
cases, suggested remedies include not only remittitur but
also ceilings and scheduling. With the substantive law
becoming more generous in recognizing nonpecuniary
harms, such as pain, mental suffering, and loss of life's
pleasures, the danger of juror abuse grows. It is then that
we begin to speak of the possibility of forcing these
amounts into a workmen's compensation-like mold, to
the anguish of some segments of the bar and the great joy
of others. As noted above, the law of damages is in fact one
aspect of the law of controlling juries.
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No portion of the law of damages is more in transition
than that dealing with punitive damages. Damages
generally are thought to be compensatory, designed to
place the offended party as he was before the event. That
is quite possible with respect to dollars lost; it is even
possible with regard to property that can be repaired or
replaced; but it is not possible for emotional harm, pain,
and mental suffering.
Even when compensation is possible, however, there
are instances in which it somehow seems inadequate. In
some of these instances, the law provides for punitive
damages to give vent, as McCormick said, to the outrage
of the jury, and to provide something for injury to
so-called dignitary interests. As commonly stated, the
purposes of punitive damages are deterrence,
compensation (probably to pay attorneys' fees), bounty
(to encourage a plaintiff to vindicate a right otherwide too
small to pursue), and vindication.
Most jurisdictions do not require a fixed ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages. The emphasis is on
hurting the defendant. McCormick spoke of exemplary
damages as "smart money"-designed to make the
defendant hurt or smart. Accordingly, punitive damages
have more to do with what it takes to hurt the defendant
and to deter him than what it takes to help the plaintiff.
Obviously, therefore, the defendant's financial situation
is important. One reason for stating a claim for punitive
damages, if there is any ground whatever, is that it gives
the plaintiff leverage to discover the defendant's financial
circumstance.
Traditionally, punitive damages have been considered
a tort remedy, there generally being none in contract. (A
contract involving fraud could sometimes carry punitive
damages, in McCormick's time, because of the similarity
to the tort of deceit; and punitive damages were awarded
for an oppressive breach by a public utility. But the
exceptions were few.)
Oppressive Breaches
More recently the courts have begun to give punitive
damages for oppressive breaches of insurance contracts.
The California courts get around the conceptual problem
straightforwardly by saying, in effect, that 'oppressive
breaches of contract are torts. Other courts reach the
result by redefining an existing tort, such as intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Still others approach the
problem head-on and simply declare that punitive
damages are allowable for a sufficiently outrageous
breach of contract. The thread in these cases is that in this
age of consumerism, punitive damages may be awarded
for an oppressive breach committed by someone with
superior economic power. They will not be awarded,
surely, in contract cases where the parties are on
reasonably equal footing.
Translating pain into dollars, placing a value on a lost
pleasure or opportunity, or even assessing the diminution
in the value of damaged property requires effective, highly
communicative language. The gifted, imaginative lawyer
who not only communicates information but evokes
emotional response will ordinarily obtain more for his
client. There have always been lawyers with superior
forensic talents, but the decades after McCormick's text
saw a surge of interest in the relationship between
persuasion and what the plaintiffs' lawyers called "the
more adequate award."
Imaginative and sometimes flamboyant trial lawyers
made national reputations with their ability to convince
jurors that intangible harms had great dollar value. The
late William Lloyd Prosser, reviewing Belli's Modern
American Trials, was critical of what he called an
orchestrated approach to wringing every last cent out of a
sympathetic jury. He said, "It is, after all, possible to
give an injured plaintiff too much." Undoubtedly there
have been emotional excesses as Prosser charged, but
there is no doubt that the forensic art has matured in these
years.
Some years ago at one of the Annual Advocacy
Institutes presented by the University of Michigan, a trial
demonstration dealt with the alleged malpractice of a
physician in so applying a cast to a broken leg that
gangrene set in and the leg had to be amputated. The
fictitious plaintiff was a single woman in her late twenties,
a dancer with aspirations to the professional stage, and
currently a university graduate student and instructor. In
his closing argument her lawyer made the obvious points
of her loss of career options, her humiliation and
consequent withdrawal from normal social intercourse,
her terminated engagement and diminished marriage-
ability, and the like.
'She Has To Hop'
All of these had been testified to, and both the evidence
and the argument were persuasive that her damages were
considerable. But after listing these elements of damage
he said, "And just think, when she gets up at night she has
to hop to the bathroom." A ripple of laughter swept over
the audience of a thousand lawyers, but it was not a sound
of amusement. Rather, it was an involuntary response to
embarrassment and to realization that he somehow had
distilled into one phrase all the physical loss, the humilia-
tion, and the suffering that were hers.
I had written the facts of the case and had created this
fictitious file. I knew there was no such person. I knew
that the plaintiff, who testified from her wheelchair, was
hiding one leg under a blanket. In short, I knew that it was
all role-playing. Yet I confess that even I had an aching in
my throat, a sudden lump, in response to the phrase he
used.
Yes, she could wear a prosthesis, and she could engage
in some of the activities that had meant so much to her
over the years. If she would simply accept life on its own
terms and take an existential view of things, why, she
might live a virtually normal life. Yes, she had been
injured through defendant's negligence (a juror might
say) but she does not need a large amount of money to
make her life relatively normal. But the moment counsel
said, "Just think, when she gets up at night she has to hop
to the bathroom," all of us knew that she would not in fact
ever be normal, or even nearly normal, again.
With persuasive techniques such as this it is not an
overstatement to suggest that improvement in the quality
of communication with jurors has had as much effect on
the size of damages as have changes in the rules of
substantive liability.
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